A Statistical Model of Inequality by Fernholz, Ricardo T.
A Statistical Model of Inequality
Ricardo T. Fernholz∗
Claremont McKenna College
September 4, 2018
Abstract
This paper develops a nonparametric statistical model of wealth distribution that
imposes little structure on the fluctuations of household wealth. In this setting, we
use new techniques to obtain a closed-form household-by-household characterization
of the stable distribution of wealth and show that this distribution is shaped entirely
by two factors—the reversion rates (a measure of cross-sectional mean reversion) and
idiosyncratic volatilities of wealth across different ranked households. By estimating
these factors, our model can exactly match the U.S. wealth distribution. This provides
information about the current trajectory of inequality as well as estimates of the dis-
tributional effects of progressive capital taxes. We find evidence that the U.S. wealth
distribution might be on a temporarily unstable trajectory, thus suggesting that further
increases in top wealth shares are likely in the near future. For capital taxes, we find
that a small tax levied on just 1% of households substantially reshapes the distribution
of wealth and reduces inequality.
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1 Introduction
Recent trends in income and wealth inequality have drawn much attention from both aca-
demic researchers and the general public. The detailed empirical work of Atkinson et al.
(2011), Davies et al. (2011), and Piketty (2014), among others, documents these trends for
many different countries around the world and has prompted a substantive debate about
their underlying causes and the appropriate policy responses, if any. The changing nature of
inequality in recent decades has also raised questions about whether these trends will reverse
or continue in the future.
To address these questions empirically, we develop a statistical model of inequality de-
rived from a more general empirical approach to rank-based processes. The model features
explicitly heterogeneous households that are subject to both aggregate and idiosyncratic
fluctuations in their wealth holdings. In contrast to much of the related empirical litera-
ture on income dynamics (see, for example, Browning et al., 2010; Altonji et al., 2013), we
impose no parametric structure on the underlying processes of household wealth accumula-
tion and do not model or estimate these processes directly. Despite the minimal structure
of our approach, we use new techniques to obtain a closed-form household-by-household
characterization of the stable distribution of wealth.1
Our characterization of the distribution of wealth yields several new results. First, we
show that the stable distribution is shaped entirely by two factors—the reversion rates and
idiosyncratic volatilities of wealth for different ranked households. The reversion rates of
household wealth measure the rate at which household wealth cross-sectionally reverts to
the mean. Because our approach allows for wealth growth rates and volatilities that vary
across different ranks in the distribution, one of this paper’s contributions is to extend and
generalize beyond previous work that relied on the homogeneity of Gibrat’s law (Gabaix,
1999, 2009).
Our statistical model can replicate any empirical distribution. Using the detailed new
wealth shares data of Saez and Zucman (2014), we construct such a match for the 2012
U.S. wealth distribution. According to these data, there has been a clear upward trend in
top wealth shares since the mid-1980s, a fact that raises significant doubt about any model
1In a closely related theoretical paper, Fernholz (2015) uses these same techniques to characterize equi-
librium wealth dynamics in an incomplete markets model. While this theoretical approach is necessarily
less general than this paper’s empirical approach, it demonstrates that our nonparametric techniques are
perfectly consistent with general equilibrium.
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that relies on an assumed steady-state or stable distribution of wealth. One innovation of
our empirical approach is that it can account for changing top wealth shares and generate
estimates of the future stable distribution of wealth. We provide such empirical estimates
for several different scenarios for the current underlying trend in top U.S. wealth shares.
These estimates yield insight into the changing nature of inequality today. In particular, our
results indicate that according to the wealth shares data of Saez and Zucman (2014), the
U.S. distribution of wealth might be on a temporarily unstable trajectory in which it splits
into two divergent subpopulations, each of which forms a separate stable distribution. This
unsustainable scenario suggests that further increases in the wealth shares of a tiny minority
of households are likely in the near future.
The flexibility of our empirical framework allows us, in principle, to estimate the distri-
butional effects of any tax policy. In practice, these estimates are likely to be most accurate
in the case of capital taxes, since the effects of such taxes on the rate of cross-sectional mean
reversion are easier to approximate. Under the assumption that a 1% capital tax reduces
the growth rate of wealth for a household paying that tax by 1%, we show that a progressive
capital tax of 1-2% levied on just 1% of households substantially reshapes the distribution
of wealth and reduces inequality. The exact impact of this capital tax depends on the future
stable U.S. distribution of wealth, but in all cases we find that this tax—which is similar to
that proposed by Piketty (2014)—significantly increases the share of total wealth held by
the bottom 90% of households in the economy.
There are a number of purely empirical models of income distribution. Both Guvenen
(2009) and Guvenen et al. (2015), for example, construct statistical models that replicate
many aspects of the U.S. distribution of income. Browning et al. (2010) and Altonji et al.
(2013) use indirect inference techniques to estimate detailed statistical models of household
income dynamics, while Bonhomme and Robin (2010) use nonparametric techniques to an-
alyze the different shocks that affect household earnings. In addition to the fact that this
paper analyzes the distribution of wealth rather than income, an important difference be-
tween this empirical literature and our approach is that we impose minimal structure on the
underlying processes of household wealth accumulation and instead model the distribution of
wealth directly. We view this paper and the empirical literature on income dynamics as com-
plements, since we focus on inequality and distributional issues and show that a parametric
empirical approach is not necessary to address these issues.
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There is also an extensive theoretical literature that considers the implications of both
uninsurable labor income risk and uninsurable capital income risk in different macroeconomic
settings. In a simple Solow growth model setting, for example, Nirei (2009) shows that
introducing uninsurable investment risk yields a realistic Pareto distribution for top income
and wealth shares. Jones and Kim (2014) consider a model in which entrepreneurs face
heterogeneous shocks to their human capital and corresponding income, and then examine
the implications of different technological and policy shocks in this setting. Adopting a more
general approach, Gabaix (2009) examines several different types of stochastic processes that
generate realistic steady-state Pareto distributions and that can be applied to topics ranging
from the distribution of wealth to CEO compensation.2
Benhabib et al. (2011, 2014) derive similarly realistic steady-state wealth distributions
in a setup in which households face uninsurable investment risk and optimally choose how
to consume and invest. In a closely related paper, Fernholz (2015) uses techniques similar
to this paper to replicate the U.S. wealth distribution in an environment in which rational,
forward-looking households face uninsurable investment risk. The theoretical literature that
considers the implications of uninsurable labor income risk is even more extensive, and
includes Krussel and Smith (1998) and Castan˜eda et al. (2003), among others.3
This paper combines elements of these empirical and theoretical literatures on income
and wealth distributions. Although we focus on the distribution of wealth, it should be noted
that our techniques, results, and general approach can be applied to any rank-based system
for which there is stability and some continuity. Indeed, only for unstable processes where
the distribution frequently and rapidly changes is our model clearly inappropriate. In terms
of the broader literature on power laws in economics and finance, then, our contribution
extends previous work by Gabaix (1999, 2009) and others who rely on equal growth rates
and volatilities throughout various distributions as implied by Gibrat’s law.
One of the central contributions of this paper is to construct a model that can generate
an exact household-by-household match for any empirical distribution while imposing few
restrictions on the underlying household wealth processes. Indeed, our approach imposes
no parametric structure on either the behavior of households or the types of shocks that
2It is also possible to generate a realistic Pareto distribution of wealth in the absence of uninsurable labor
and capital income risk. See, for example, Jones (2014), who accomplishes this using a simple birth-death
process combined with standard wealth accumulation dynamics.
3For a general survey of this literature, see Cagetti and De Nardi (2008).
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those households face. Furthermore, we do not assume that all households are the same ex-
ante, which contrasts with many theoretical models of wealth inequality despite the empirical
evidence in support of heterogeneous income profiles (Guvenen, 2007; Browning et al., 2010).
The only assumptions that we do impose are that household wealth can be reasonably
modeled by continuous semi-martingales satisfying certain basic regularity conditions and
that the distribution of wealth across households is asymptotically stable. In this way, our
model and results characterize the stable distribution of wealth in a more general setting
than in the previous literature.
According to our characterization, the share of wealth held for each rank in the distribu-
tion depends only on the reversion rates and idiosyncratic volatilities of wealth for different
ranked households. Regardless of how complex the underlying economic environment is,
these two rank-based factors measure all aspects of this environment that are relevant to
the stable distribution of wealth. As a consequence, the effect of any economic change on
inequality can potentially be inferred from its effect on mean reversion and idiosyncratic
volatility. In this way, our model provides a simple unified framework by which we may un-
derstand the distributional impact of many of the most important developments of the past
few decades, such as skill-biased technical change, globalization, and changes in institutions
and tax policies.
In order to match the model to the 2012 U.S. distribution of wealth, we estimate the
idiosyncratic volatility of wealth for households across different ranks using previous work
on the volatility of uninsurable investments (Flavin and Yamashita, 2002; Moskowitz and
Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002) and labor income (Guvenen et al., 2015). With these volatility
estimates, we are able to infer the implied values for the reversion rates of wealth for different
ranked households. These rank-based reversion rates generate a perfect match of a stable
2012 U.S. wealth distribution.
The wealth shares data of Saez and Zucman (2014), however, show a clear upward trend in
top wealth shares starting in the mid-1980s, which is not consistent with a stable distribution.
One contribution of this paper is to introduce a methodology that addresses these stability
issues and can provide estimates of the future stable distribution of wealth. In other words,
even though the U.S. distribution of wealth may currently be transitioning and not stable,
we can still estimate where this distribution is transitioning to. One of the strengths of these
estimates is that they are purely empirical and rely on no assumptions about the underlying
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causes of increasing inequality. In order to generate these estimates, we adjust the reversion
rates for different ranked households to account for any trends in top wealth shares. Because
there is substantial uncertainty about these trends, we consider several alternative scenarios
for the underlying current trend in top U.S. wealth shares and estimate the trajectory of the
U.S. distribution of wealth for each scenario. These estimates reveal that the future stable
distribution of wealth is quite sensitive to changes in the underlying trend in top wealth
shares. These estimates are, to our knowledge, the first purely empirical estimates of the
changing nature of U.S. inequality.
Every alternative scenario that we consider for the underlying current trend in top U.S.
wealth shares is below the rate of increasing top shares for the last few decades as reported
by Saez and Zucman (2014).4 The reason we do not consider a higher-trend scenario is that
the rate of increasing top shares over the past few decades is difficult to reconcile with any
stable distribution of wealth. In effect, our model suggests that the changes in top shares
reported by Saez and Zucman (2014) might only be consistent with a divergent trajectory
in which the U.S. wealth distribution separates into two subpopulations. This trajectory, in
which a tiny minority of wealthy households will eventually hold all wealth, is unlikely to
continue indefinitely, thus suggesting that some aspect of the economic environment is likely
to change.
The result that inequality is entirely determined by two statistical factors means that, in
principle, our framework can provide estimates about the effects of different tax policies on
the distribution of wealth. All that is necessary to generate these estimates are the effects
of these different tax policies on mean reversion and idiosyncratic volatilities of wealth for
different ranked households. In practice, however, obtaining precise measurements of the
differential impact of certain tax policies on households throughout the distribution of wealth
is quite difficult. One important exception is the case of progressive capital taxes. The
approach of this paper is uniquely suited to estimating the distributional effects of capital
taxes because such taxes have more predictable effects on reversion rates. In particular,
for the estimates we present in this paper, we assume that a 1% capital tax reduces the
growth rate of wealth for a household paying that tax by 1%. Because reversion rates are
4This is not true of all wealth shares data, however. Some studies based on the Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF), for example, find smaller (or no) increases in top shares (Wolff, 2010). This is one reason
why we consider many different scenarios for the current trend in top shares. Furthermore, our model is
easily adjusted to match any wealth shares data and any underlying trend in top shares.
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measured as minus the growth rate of wealth relative to the economy for different ranked
households, this 1% capital tax will also raise the taxed household’s reversion rate by 1%.
This assumption ignores any behavioral responses and distortions caused by taxes, but it
is nonetheless a useful starting scenario to consider the distributional effects of progressive
taxation. By adjusting the effect of capital taxes on the rank-based reversion rates, it is
straightforward to extend this analysis to include any potential behavioral responses.
Using our model of the 2012 U.S. wealth distribution, we estimate the impact on inequal-
ity of a progressive capital tax of 1-2% levied on 1% of households in the economy. This
tax is similar to the tax proposed by Piketty (2014), and although its full effect depends
on the future stable U.S. distribution of wealth, in all cases we find that this capital tax
substantially reduces inequality and reshapes the distribution of wealth. Indeed, if the 2012
U.S. wealth distribution is assumed to be stable, then our estimates suggest that this tax
would reduce inequality to levels comparable to those observed in the U.S. in the 1970s. We
stress that this result is not a statement about total welfare and not an endorsement of a
progressive capital tax. Our model does not incorporate or measure any distortions or other
costs typically associated with taxes. Instead, our analysis of the distributional effects of
progressive capital taxes is meant only to enhance our overall understanding of the implica-
tions of such a policy. After all, much of the recent discussion of capital taxes has focused
on how they might increase government revenues or distort economic outcomes rather than
how they might affect inequality and the distribution of wealth. This paper addresses this
gap in our knowledge.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and char-
acterizes the stable distribution of wealth. Section 3 presents several empirical applications
of the model, including an analysis of the current trajectory of the U.S. wealth distribution
and an estimate of the effect of progressive capital taxes on inequality. Section 4 concludes.
A discussion of the assumptions underlying the model and results is in Appendix A, while
all of the proofs from the paper are in Appendix B.
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2 Model
Consider an economy that is populated by N > 1 households.5 Time is continuous and de-
noted by t ∈ [ 0,∞), and uncertainty in this economy is represented by a filtered probability
space (Ω,F ,Ft, P ). Let B(t) = (B1(t), . . . , BM(t)), t ∈ [0,∞), be an M -dimensional Brow-
nian motion defined on the probability space, with M ≥ N . We assume that all stochastic
processes are adapted to {Ft; t ∈ [0,∞)}, the augmented filtration generated by B.6
2.1 Household Wealth Dynamics
The total wealth of each household i = 1, . . . , N in this economy is given by the process wi.
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Each of these wealth processes evolves according to the stochastic differential equation
d logwi(t) = µi(t) dt+
M∑
z=1
δiz(t) dBz(t), (2.1)
where µi and δiz, z = 1, . . . ,M , are measurable and adapted processes. The growth rates
and volatilities µi and δiz are general and practically unrestricted (they can depend on
any household characteristics), having only to satisfy a few basic regularity conditions that
are discussed in Appendix A. These conditions imply that the wealth processes for the
households in the economy are continuous semimartingales, which represent a broad class
of stochastic processes (for a detailed discussion, see Karatzas and Shreve, 1991).8 Indeed,
the martingale representation theorem (Nielsen, 1999) implies that any plausible continuous
wealth process can be written in the nonparametric form of equation (2.1). Furthermore,
this section’s results are also likely to apply to wealth processes that are subject to sporadic,
5For consistency and simplicity, we shall refer to households holding wealth throughout this section.
However, it is important to note that our approach and results are applicable to many other empirical
distributions, as mentioned in the introduction.
6In order to simplify the exposition, we shall omit many of the less important regularity conditions and
technical details involved with continuous-time stochastic processes.
7By considering a discrete set of explicitly heterogeneous households, this model deviates from much of
the previous literature in which there is a continuum of households. This assumption is necessary for our
approach and provides analytical tractability and detail in our results.
8This basic setup shares much in common with the continuous-time finance literature (see, for example,
Karatzas and Shreve, 1998; Duffie, 2001). Continuous semimartingales are more general than Itoˆ processes,
which are common in the continuous-time finance literature (Nielsen, 1999).
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discontinuous jumps.9
The general, nonparametric structure of our approach implies that almost all previous
empirical and theoretical models of income and wealth represent special cases of equation
(2.1). Indeed, most of the theoretical literature on wealth distribution assumes that house-
holds are ex-ante symmetric and hence that the growth rate parameters µi and the standard
deviation parameters δiz in equation (2.1) do not persistently differ across households (Ben-
habib et al., 2011; Jones and Kim, 2014; Fernholz, 2015).10 This ex-ante symmetry is, for
example, a key assumption of any analyses based on Gibrat’s law (Gabaix, 1999, 2009). Even
when the parameters µi and δiz do persistently differ across households, such as in much of
the empirical literature on income processes (Guvenen, 2009; Browning et al., 2010), this
heterogeneity is usually constrained by some specific parametric structure. In this sense,
then, our model encompasses and extends much of the previous related literature.
One of the model’s assumptions ensures that no two households’ wealth dynamics are
perfectly correlated over time. In other words, markets are incomplete and all households
face at least some idiosyncratic risk to their wealth holdings. This assumption is consistent
with both the Bewley models of uninsurable labor income risk (Aiyagari, 1994; Krussel and
Smith, 1998) and the more recent literature that considers uninsurable capital income risk
(Angeletos and Calvet, 2006; Benhabib et al., 2011; Fernholz, 2015). This section’s results
characterize the effect of idiosyncratic risk to households’ wealth holdings on inequality.
It is useful to describe the dynamics of total wealth for the economy, which we denote by
w(t) = w1(t) + · · ·+ wN(t). In order to do so, we first characterize the covariance of wealth
across different households over time. For all i, j = 1, . . . , N , let the covariance process ρij
be given by
ρij(t) =
M∑
z=1
δiz(t)δjz(t). (2.2)
Applying Itoˆ’s Lemma to equation (2.1), we are now able to describe the dynamics of the
total wealth process w.
9In a less general setting, Fernholz (2015) presents such an extension motivated by the fact that a function
with sporadic, discontinuous jumps can be approximated arbitrarily well by a continuous function.
10If it is assumed that households are ex-ante symmetric, however, then we can do even more with this
setup. In particular, it is possible to describe the extent of economic mobility in the economy and examine
the relationship between mobility and inequality. See Fernholz (2015) for a detailed discussion.
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Lemma 2.1. The dynamics of the process for total wealth in the economy w are given by
d logw(t) = µ(t) dt+
N∑
i=1
M∑
z=1
θi(t)δiz(t) dBz(t), a.s., (2.3)
where
θi(t) =
wi(t)
w(t)
, (2.4)
for i = 1, . . . , N , and
µ(t) =
N∑
i=1
θi(t)µi(t) +
1
2
(
N∑
i=1
θi(t)ρii(t)−
N∑
i,j=1
θi(t)θj(t)ρij(t)
)
. (2.5)
In order to characterize the stable distribution of wealth in this economy, it is neces-
sary to consider the dynamics of household wealth by rank. One of the key insights of this
model and of this paper more generally is that rank-based wealth dynamics are the essential
determinants of inequality. As we demonstrate below, there is a simple, direct, and ro-
bust relationship between rank-based growth rates of wealth and the distribution of wealth.
This relationship is a purely statistical result and hence can be applied to any economic
environment, no matter how complex.
The first step in achieving this characterization is to introduce notation for household
rank based on total wealth holdings. For k = 1, . . . , N , let
w(k)(t) = max
1≤i1<···<ik≤N
min (wi1(t), . . . , wik(t)) , (2.6)
so that w(k)(t) represents the wealth held by the household with the k-th most wealth among
all the households in the economy at time t. One consequence of this definition is that
max(w1(t), . . . , wN(t)) = w(1)(t) ≥ w(2)(t) ≥ · · · ≥ w(N)(t) = min(w1, . . . , wN(t)). (2.7)
Similarly, let θ(k)(t) be the share of total wealth held by the k-th wealthiest household at
time t, so that
θ(k)(t) =
w(k)(t)
w(t)
, (2.8)
for k = 1, . . . , N .
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The next step is to describe the dynamics of the household rank wealth processes w(k)
and rank wealth share processes θ(k), k = 1, . . . , N . Unfortunately, this task is complicated
by the fact that the max and min functions from equation (2.6) are not differentiable, and
hence we cannot simply apply Itoˆ’s Lemma in this case. Instead, we introduce the notion of
a local time to solve this problem. For any continuous process x, the local time at 0 for x is
the process Λx defined by
Λx(t) =
1
2
(
|x(t)| − |x(0)| −
∫ t
0
sgn(x(s)) dx(s)
)
. (2.9)
As detailed by Karatzas and Shreve (1991), the local time for x measures the amount of time
the process x spends near zero.11 To be able to link household rank to household index, let
pt be the random permutation of {1, . . . , N} such that for 1 ≤ i, k ≤ N ,
pt(k) = i if w(k)(t) = wi(t). (2.10)
This definition implies that pt(k) = i whenever household i is the k-th wealthiest household
in the economy, with ties broken in some consistent manner.
Lemma 2.2. For all k = 1, . . . , N , the dynamics of the household rank wealth processes w(k)
and rank wealth share processes θ(k) are given by
d logw(k)(t) = d logwpt(k)(t) +
1
2
dΛlogw(k)−logw(k+1)(t)−
1
2
dΛlogw(k−1)−logw(k)(t), (2.11)
a.s, and
d log θ(k)(t) = d log θpt(k)(t) +
1
2
dΛlog θ(k)−log θ(k+1)(t)−
1
2
dΛlog θ(k−1)−log θ(k)(t), (2.12)
a.s., with the convention that Λlogw(0)−logw(1)(t) = Λlogw(N)−logw(N+1)(t) = 0.
According to equation (2.11) from the lemma, the dynamics of wealth for the k-th
wealthiest household in the economy are the same as those for the household that is the
k-th wealthiest at time t (household i = pt(k)), plus two local time processes that capture
changes in household rank (one household overtakes another in wealth) over time.12 To
11For more discussion of local times, and especially their connection to rank processes, see Fernholz (2002).
12For brevity, we write dxpt(k)(t) to refer to the process
∑N
i=1 1{i=pt(k)}dxi(t) throughout this paper.
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understand this equation, note that the positive local time term Λlog θ(k)−log θ(k+1) ensures
that the wealth holdings of the k-th wealthiest household are always larger than those of
the k + 1-th wealthiest household, and that the negative local time term Λlogw(k−1)−logw(k)
ensures that the wealth holdings of the k-th wealthiest household are always smaller than
those of the k− 1-th wealthiest. Equation (2.12) describes the similar dynamics of the rank
wealth share processes θ(k).
Using equations (2.1) and (2.3) and the definition of θi(t), we have that for all i =
1, . . . , N ,
d log θi(t) = d logwi(t)− d logw(t)
= µi(t) dt+
M∑
z=1
δiz(t) dBz(t)− µ(t) dt−
N∑
i=1
M∑
z=1
θi(t)δiz(t) dBz(t). (2.13)
If we apply Lemma 2.2 to equation (2.13), then it follows that
d log θ(k)(t) =
(
µpt(k)(t)− µ(t)
)
dt+
M∑
z=1
δpt(k)z(t) dBz(t)−
N∑
i=1
M∑
z=1
θi(t)δiz(t) dBz(t)
+
1
2
dΛlog θ(k)−log θ(k+1)(t)−
1
2
dΛlog θ(k−1)−log θ(k)(t),
(2.14)
a.s, for all k = 1, . . . , N . Equation (2.14), in turn, implies that the process log θ(k)− log θ(k+1)
satisfies, a.s., for all k = 1, . . . , N − 1,
d
(
log θ(k)(t)− log θ(k+1)(t)
)
=
(
µpt(k)(t)− µpt(k+1)(t)
)
dt+ dΛlog θ(k)−log θ(k+1)(t)
− 1
2
dΛlog θ(k−1)−log θ(k)(t)−
1
2
dΛlog θ(k+1)−log θ(k+2)(t)
+
M∑
z=1
(
δpt(k)z(t)− δpt(k+1)z(t)
)
dBz(t).
(2.15)
The processes for relative wealth holdings of adjacent households in the distribution of wealth
as given by equation (2.15) are key to describing the stable distribution of wealth in this
setup.
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2.2 Stable Distribution of Wealth
The results presented above allow us to analytically characterize the stable distribution of
wealth in this setup. Let αk equal the time-averaged limit of the expected growth rate of
wealth for the k-th wealthiest household relative to the expected growth rate of wealth for
the whole economy, so that
αk = lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
(
µpt(k)(t)− µ(t)
)
dt, (2.16)
for k = 1, . . . , N . The relative growth rates αk determine the reversion rates of household
wealth and are a rough measure of the rate at which wealth cross-sectionally reverts to the
mean. These parameters incorporate all aspects of the economic environment, including
taxes and diminishing returns to wealth accumulation.
In a similar manner, we wish to define the time-averaged limit of the volatility of the pro-
cess log θ(k) − log θ(k+1), which measures the relative wealth holdings of adjacent households
in the distribution of wealth. For all k = 1, . . . , N − 1, let σk be given by
σ2k = lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
M∑
z=1
(
δpt(k)z(t)− δpt(k+1)z(t)
)2
dt. (2.17)
The relative growth rates αk together with the volatilities σk entirely determine the shape
of the stable distribution of wealth in this economy. Finally, for all k = 1, . . . , N , let
κk = lim
T→∞
1
T
Λlog θ(k)−log θ(k+1)(T ). (2.18)
Let κ0 = 0, as well. In Appendix B, we show that the parameters αk and κk are related by
αk − αk+1 = 12κk−1 − κk + 12κk+1, for all k = 1, . . . , N − 1.
The distribution of wealth in this economy is stable if the limits in equations (2.16)-(2.18)
all exist and if the limits in equations (2.17)-(2.18) are positive constants. Throughout this
paper, we assume that the limits in equations (2.16)-(2.18) do in fact exist.
The stable version of the process log θ(k) − log θ(k+1) is the process log θˆ(k) − log θˆ(k+1)
defined by
d
(
log θˆ(k)(t)− log θˆ(k+1)(t)
)
= −κk dt+ dΛlog θˆ(k)−log θˆ(k+1)(t) + σk dB(t), (2.19)
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for all k = 1, . . . , N − 1.13 The stable version of log θ(k) − log θ(k+1) replaces all of the
processes from the right-hand side of equation (2.15) with their time-averaged limits, with
the exception of the local time process Λlog θ(k)−log θ(k+1) . By considering the stable version of
these relative wealth holdings processes, we are able to obtain a simple characterization of
the distribution of wealth.
Theorem 2.3. There is a stable distribution of wealth in this economy if and only if α1 +
· · · + αk < 0, for k = 1, . . . , N − 1. Furthermore, if there is a stable distribution of wealth,
then for k = 1, . . . , N − 1, this distribution satisfies
lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
(
log θˆ(k)(t)− log θˆ(k+1)(t)
)
dt =
σ2k
−4(α1 + · · ·+ αk) , a.s. (2.20)
Theorem 2.3 provides an analytic household-by-household characterization of the entire
stable distribution of wealth. This is achieved despite minimal assumptions on the processes
that describe the dynamics of household wealth over time. In fact, as the time-averaged
limits in equations (2.16)-(2.18) and (2.20) suggest, we do not assume that a steady-state
distribution of wealth even exists, but rather that the system of wealth processes is asymp-
totically stable in the sense that the limits (2.16)-(2.18) exist. Furthermore, as long as the
relative growth rates, volatilities, and local times that we take limits of do not change dras-
tically and frequently over time, then the distribution of the stable versions of θ(k) from
Theorem 2.3 will accurately reflect the distribution of the true versions of these rank wealth
share processes.14 For this reason, we shall assume that equation (2.20) approximately de-
scribes the true versions of θ(k) throughout much of this paper. The issue of stability of the
distribution of wealth is discussed in more detail in Section 3.
The theorem yields two important insights. First, it shows that an understanding of rank-
based household wealth dynamics is sufficient to describe the entire distribution of wealth. It
is not necessary to directly model and estimate household wealth dynamics by name, denoted
by index i, as is common in the literature on earnings dynamics. Second, the theorem shows
that the only two factors that affect the distribution of wealth are the rank-based reversion
rates, measured by the quantities −αk, and the rank-based volatilities, σk. To understand
13For each k = 1, . . . , N , equation (2.19) implicitly defines another Brownian motion B(t), t ∈ [0,∞).
These Brownian motions can covary in any way across different k.
14Fernholz (2002) discusses these issues in more detail and shows that Theorem 2.3 provides an accurate
depiction of the U.S. stock market.
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the effect of policy, institutions, technology, globalization, or any other relevant factor on
inequality, then, it is necessary only to understand their effect on these reversion rates
and volatilities. Furthermore, if quantitative estimates of these effects can be obtained, then
Theorem 2.3 provides a quantitative description of the impact on inequality. This observation
underlies our analysis of the effect of progressive capital taxes on the distribution of wealth
in Section 3.
The characterization in equation (2.20) extends earlier analyses of power law distributions
based on Gibrat’s law. Indeed, Gibrat’s law is a very special case of Theorem 2.3 in which the
cross-sectional mean reversion and volatility parameters αk and σk are equal across different
ranks k. In this case, the theorem confirms that in fact this setup yields a Pareto distribution
(a straight line in a log-log plot of rank k versus wealth holdings θk) as in Gabaix (1999,
2009). One of this paper’s contributions is to move past Gibrat’s law and characterize how
growth rates and volatilities that vary across different ranks can generate any empirical
distribution. In Section 3, we use this flexibility to construct an exact match of the U.S.
wealth distribution.
According to Theorem 2.3, asymptotic stability of the distribution of wealth requires that
the reversion rates −αk must sum to positive quantities, for all k = 1, . . . , N − 1. Stability,
then, requires a mean reversion condition in the sense that the growth rate of wealth for the
wealthiest households in the economy must be strictly below the growth rate of wealth for
less wealthy households. As a consequence, even if some households are more skilled than
others in that, all else equal, their expected growth rates of wealth µi(t) are higher, stability
still requires that these skilled households have lower expected growth rates of wealth when
they occupy the upper ranks of the wealth distribution.
If the mean reversion condition from Theorem 2.3 is not satisfied, then the distribution
of wealth will separate into divergent subpopulations. In order to describe this unstable
scenario, for 1 ≤ m ≤ N , let
Am =
α1 + · · ·+ αm
m
, (2.21)
so that Am is the average relative growth rate of wealth for the top m wealthiest households
in the economy.
Theorem 2.4. Suppose that the reversion rates are such that α1 + · · · + αk ≥ 0, for some
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k < N , and that there exists some m < N such that
Am = max
1≤k≤N
Ak and Am > Al for l 6= m. (2.22)
In this case, there exists a stable distribution of wealth for the subset of ranked households
w(1), . . . , w(m), and the share of total wealth held by this top subset of households satisfies
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lim
T→∞
θ(1)(T ) + · · ·+ θ(m)(T ) = 1, a.s. (2.23)
The stable distribution of wealth for the top subpopulation of households w(1), . . . , w(m)
is described using Theorem 2.3, with the parameters αk defined as the time-averaged limit of
the growth rates of wealth for different ranked households relative to the growth rate of the
total wealth held by this group of households (same as equation (2.16), but with µ(t) replaced
by the growth rate of w(1)+· · ·+w(m)) and the volatility parameters σ1, . . . , σm−1 unchanged.
This wealthy subset of households forms a separate stable distribution and eventually holds
all wealth in the economy. During this process of divergence, this top subset of households
gradually separates from the rest of the population so that eventually there is no more
mobility between groups.16
As we shall explain in Section 3, the divergent scenario of Theorem 2.4 may in fact be
relevant to the current trajectory of the U.S. distribution of wealth. This theorem describes
a particularly blatant form of divergence in which the wealth holdings of some subset of
rich households is growing more quickly than the total wealth of the economy. In fact, the
distribution of wealth is unstable even if all households have equal growth rates of wealth
and hence no subset of households is growing faster than any other. In terms of the rank-
based relative growth rates αk, this implies that α1 = · · · = αN and hence that all reversion
rates are equal to zero. This special case has been analyzed in detail by both Fargione et al.
(2011) and Fernholz and Fernholz (2014), the latter of who show that in this scenario wealth
becomes increasingly concentrated over time in the sense that the time-averaged limit of the
top wealth share θ(1) converges to one.
15It is unlikely but possible that there are two or more maxima and hence Am = Al for some l 6= m. In
this case, there still exists a divergent subset of households, although equation (2.23) must be changed to a
time-averaged limit. This divergent subset is made up of the smallest subset of households with an average
relative growth rate that is a maximum. See Fernholz and Fernholz (2014) for a proof.
16See the proof of Theorem 2.4 in Appendix B for a proof of this mobility result.
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3 Empirical Applications
We wish to use the empirical approach of Section 2 for several applications. One of this
approach’s strengths is that it can replicate any empirical distribution. In this section, we
estimate the nonparametric model using the detailed new U.S. wealth distribution data of
Saez and Zucman (2014).17 We then use this estimated model to analyze future trends
in inequality and to consider the distributional effects of progressive capital taxes under
different assumptions about the future.
3.1 Estimating the Model
Throughout this paper, we set the number of households in the economy N equal to one
million. This number balances the need for realism with the need to perform computations
and simulations in a reasonable amount of time. Furthermore, all of our results are essentially
unchanged with an even larger number of households in the economy.
According to equation (2.20) from Theorem 2.3, the stable distribution of wealth in the
economy satisfies, for all k = 1, . . . , N − 1,
lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
(
log θˆ(k)(t)− log θˆ(k+1)(t)
)
dt =
σ2k
−4(α1 + · · ·+ αk) , a.s. (3.1)
This equation establishes a simple relationship between inequality as measured by the time-
averaged limit of log θˆ(k)(t) − log θˆ(k+1)(t), the rank-based reversion rates, −αk, and the
rank-based volatilities, σk. As discussed in Section 2, we shall assume that equation (3.1)
approximately describes the true versions of the wealth shares θ(k). Ideally, we would use
detailed panel data on individual households’ wealth holdings over time to estimate the
quantities αk and σk, and then confirm that these estimates replicate the observed wealth
shares θ(k).
18 Of course, a comprehensive panel data set on household wealth holdings in the
U.S. does not yet exist. Given these data limitations, we instead choose to use estimates of
the wealth shares θ(k) and the rank-based volatilities σk to infer the values of the rank-based
reversion rates αk via equation (3.1).
17We use the wealth shares data of Saez and Zucman (2014) because of its great detail, especially for top
shares. It should be noted, however, that the procedure of estimating the model described in this section
can be applied to any distribution of wealth.
18This is the approach of Fernholz (2002), who shows that a similar model accurately replicates the
distribution of total market capitalizations for U.S. stocks.
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The first step in this process is to generate estimates of the rank-based volatilities σk.
According to equation (2.17), these volatilities correspond to the time-averaged limit of the
quadratic variation for the process log θ(k) − log θ(k+1), which measures the relative wealth
holdings of households that are adjacent in the wealth distribution. There is no research
that directly estimates this quantity for U.S. household wealth holdings, but there is research
that estimates the volatility of labor income and of the idiosyncratic component of capital
income. We shall use these estimates to construct estimates of the volatility of relative
wealth holdings.
In order to generate these estimates, consider the dynamic relationship between household
wealth holdings, capital income, labor income, and consumption. If we let λi, ci, and ri
denote, respectively, the after-tax labor income, consumption, and after-tax return processes
for household i = 1, . . . , N , then the dynamics of wealth over time for each household i are
given by
dwi(t) = wi(t)ri(t) dt+ (λi(t)− ci(t)) dt = wi(t)
(
ri(t) +
λi(t)− ci(t)
wi(t)
)
dt. (3.2)
It follows that to estimate the volatility of log household wealth holdings, we need estimates
of the volatility of both idiosyncratic after-tax investment returns and idiosyncratic fluc-
tuations in after-tax labor income minus consumption (savings), with the latter volatility
expressed relative to total wealth holdings. Ownership of primary housing and private equity
are well-documented examples of uninsurable investments subject to idiosyncratic risk. Fol-
lowing Angeletos (2007), Benhabib et al. (2011), Fernholz (2015), and much of the growing
macroeconomic literature to feature idiosyncratic capital income risk, we set the standard
deviation of idiosyncratic investment returns equal to 0.2. This value is derived from the
empirical analyses of Flavin and Yamashita (2002) and Case and Shiller (1989) for ownership
of primary housing, and Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) for private equity.
Measuring the volatility of idiosyncratic fluctuations in after-tax labor income minus
consumption relative to total wealth holdings is more difficult. Indeed, there is no research
that directly measures this volatility. For our purposes, we wish to construct low and high
estimates of this volatility, which, because it depends on household wealth holdings, will
vary across the distribution of wealth. To construct these estimates, we first follow Guvenen
et al. (2015) and set the standard deviation of changes in log labor income equal to 0.5. We
then combine this figure with the earnings and wealth holdings data from the 2007 Survey
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of Consumer Finances as reported by Dı´az-Gime´nez et al. (2011) to construct estimates
of the volatility of labor income relative to wealth holdings, which we assume is equal to
the volatility of idiosyncratic fluctuations in after-tax labor income minus consumption rel-
ative to total wealth. Intentionally, these estimates may overstate the true volatility since
they assume that all fluctuations in labor income both are idiosyncratic and lead to corre-
sponding fluctuations in labor income minus consumption (there is no offsetting change in
consumption).
If we add the estimated standard deviation of idiosyncratic fluctuations in labor income
minus consumption relative to total wealth holdings to our estimate of the standard devia-
tion of idiosyncratic investment returns 0.2, then we obtain high estimates of the rank-based
volatilities σk.
19 These high estimates are reported in the third column of Table 1. We shall
also consider low estimates of σk, in which we assume that there is no volatility of idiosyn-
cratic fluctuations in labor income minus consumption so that the rank-based volatilities are
all equal to
√
0.22 + 0.22 = 0.28. These low estimates are reported in the second column of
Table 1.
Taken together, the low and high estimates of σk cover a wide range of plausible values for
the rank-based volatilities.20 This wide range reflects the substantial uncertainty that exists
regarding the true volatility of the process θ(k) − θ(k+1), which measures the relative wealth
holdings of households that are adjacent in the wealth distribution. Despite this uncertainty,
however, these low and high estimates of σk very likely provide lower and upper bounds for
the true values of these parameters. Indeed, all of the available empirical evidence suggests
that the true values of σk are above our low estimates and below our high estimates. Future
work that estimates these rank-based volatilities more accurately will help to narrow this
range.
The last step in estimating the model and matching the U.S. wealth distribution is to
infer values for cross-sectional mean reversion −αk using equation (3.1). Normally, this
is straightforward since the system of N − 1 equations (3.1) together with the fact that
α1 + · · · + αN = 0 yields a solution. The problem, in this case, is that there are no wealth
shares data that report the wealth holdings of each individual household in the economy θk.
19More precisely, these estimates are generated by adding the estimated variance of idiosyncratic fluctu-
ations in labor income minus consumption relative to total wealth holdings to the estimated variance of
idiosyncratic investment returns, multiplying by two, and then taking the square root.
20One implication of this is that these estimates of σk also imply a range of plausible values for the reversion
rates −αk, since these values are inferred using estimates of σk and the wealth shares θ(k).
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Indeed, the data of Saez and Zucman (2014) report the wealth holdings of just a few subsets
of U.S. households.
To fill in the missing wealth shares data, we assume a Pareto-like distribution of wealth in
which the parameter of the Pareto distribution varies across different subsets of households
in a way that matches the data. In fact, we find that varying the Pareto parameter across
just three subsets of households achieves a nearly perfect match of the 2012 U.S. wealth
distribution as reported by Saez and Zucman (2014). Changing the Pareto parameter in
this way is equivalent to assuming that the log-log plot of household rank versus household
wealth holdings consists of three connected straight lines with different slopes.21 A plot of
this kind that achieves the closest possible match for the 2012 U.S. wealth distribution is
shown in Figure 1. This plot shows the value of log wealth shares θ(k) versus the log of
rank k. Once the household wealth shares θk are set, the rank-based reversion rates −αk are
inferred by solving the system of N − 1 equations (3.1).
In the case of a standard Pareto distribution, a log-log plot as in Figure 1 appears as a
single straight line with slope equal to the inverse of the Pareto parameter. Our approach
is slightly more general and is preferred to restricting the stable distribution of wealth to a
distribution such as Pareto or lognormal since it allows the model to more closely replicate
the empirical distribution of wealth. This increased accuracy and flexibility highlights one of
the model’s advantages. Furthermore, our basic qualitative results remain unchanged even
if we do restrict the stable distribution of wealth to a common distribution.
3.2 The U.S. Wealth Distribution, Present and Future
The process of estimating the model as described in the previous subsection can be applied
to any empirical distribution of wealth. This process yields implied values for the rank-based
reversion rates −αk using wealth shares data and estimates of the volatilities σk. Thus, if
we use the 2012 U.S. wealth shares data of Saez and Zucman (2014)—the most recent year
these data cover—together with our low and high estimates of σk as reported in Table 1,
21More specifically, there is one straight line for the top 0.01% of households, that line connects to another
straight line with a different slope for the top 0.01-10% of households, and that line connects to a third
straight line with a different slope for the bottom 90% of households. Such a distribution generates a total
absolute error relative to the true U.S. distribution of wealth in 2012 of just over 0.5%. While it is certainly
possible to vary this slope across even more subsets of households, our approach balances simplicity and
accuracy without altering the model’s basic results or predictions.
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then this generates low and high values for the rank-based reversion rates.22 These reversion
rates generate a perfect match of a stable 2012 U.S. wealth distribution.
As the wealth shares data of Saez and Zucman (2014) demonstrate, however, stability of
the 2012 U.S. distribution of wealth is unlikely. Indeed, a stable distribution is one in which
wealth shares are not trending up or down over time, but these data show that the share
of total U.S. wealth held by the top 0.01% and 0.01-0.1% of households has been steadily
rising since the mid-1980s. Our methodology offers several ways to address these stability
issues. Most importantly, it is possible to estimate the future stable distribution of wealth
using the empirical approach of Section 2.
In order to estimate the future stable distribution, we first observe the rate at which
various wealth shares are changing in the economy, and then adjust the rank-based relative
growth rates αk accordingly. For example, if we observe that the share of total wealth held by
the top 1% of households is increasing at a rate of one percent per year, then we must increase
by one percent the value of αk for all households in the top 1%. A similar adjustment must
be made for all other subsets of households based on their changing shares of total wealth
over time, as well. The future stable distribution that the current distribution of wealth is
transitioning towards is then determined by the rank-based reversion rates implied by these
adjusted relative growth rates αk. One of the strengths of this empirical estimation strategy
is that it depends only on the rate at which top wealth shares are changing over time and
does not rely on any assumptions about the underlying causes of these changes.
The logic behind these adjustments to the parameters αk is simple. In a stable distri-
bution, the growth rate of wealth of the k-th wealthiest household relative to the whole
economy is equal to αk. Because this distribution is stable, the share of wealth held by the
k-th wealthiest household θ(k) should be growing by zero percent per year. If we instead
observe that θ(k) is growing by one percent, then this implies that our estimate of αk is one
percent too low.23 Indeed, if our estimates of αk were correct, then the distribution of wealth
would be stable, so any observed instability implies that these estimates must be adjusted.
In order to estimate the future stable distribution of wealth in the U.S., then, we shall
use our estimates of mean reversion −αk for a stable 2012 U.S. wealth distribution and then
22Because this procedure produces two sets of one million different αk values, we cannot directly report
these estimates in the paper.
23Of course, a more direct approach is to directly measure the relative growth rates αk empirically using
panel data. Unfortunately, the lack of a comprehensive panel data set for wealth holdings rules this out.
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adjust these estimates to account for different transitioning wealth shares scenarios. We
consider four such scenarios. In the first, we simply assume that the U.S. wealth distribution
was stable in 2012. Although this stable scenario is unrealistic given the observed changes
in top wealth shares over the past few decades, as discussed above, it is nevertheless a useful
baseline case to consider.
In the second scenario, we assume that the share of wealth held by the top 0.01% of
households is increasing by 1% per year while the share of total wealth held by the bottom
90% of households is decreasing by 0.5% per year. No other subset of households is altering
its share of total wealth in this scenario. The third scenario posits that the shares of total
wealth held by the top 0.01% and 0.01-0.1% of households are increasing by 1.5% and 0.5%
per year, respectively, while the share of total wealth held by the bottom 90% of households
is decreasing by 1% per year. Finally, in the fourth scenario, we assume that the shares of
total wealth held by the top 0.01% and 0.01-0.1% of households are increasing by 3% and 1%
per year, respectively, while the share of total wealth held by the bottom 90% of households
is decreasing by 1.5% per year.
This process of adjusting the rank-based relative growth rates αk to determine the ad-
justed reversion rates and estimate the future stable distribution of wealth in the U.S. can be
applied to any observed changes in wealth shares over time. The four scenarios we consider
are intended to capture a range of possible future changes in wealth shares that are of a
smaller magnitude than those changes observed in the past few decades, according to the
data of Saez and Zucman (2014).24 Indeed, the magnitude of the changes observed in wealth
shares over the past 30 years according to these data is difficult to reconcile with any stable
distribution of wealth, a point we discuss in more detail below.
The predicted future stable distributions of wealth for the four scenarios are reported
in Tables 2-5. These future distributions vary across the low and high estimates of the
volatilities σk, although the tables show that the range of possible outcomes in between these
two estimates is in most cases fairly narrow. The four scenarios taken together demonstrate
that even a small upward trend in the top wealth shares of today’s U.S. economy may imply
a substantial increase in wealth concentration once the distribution stabilizes in the future.
Indeed, Scenario 3, in which the shares of wealth held by the top 0.01% and 0.01-0.1%
24The changes in top shares over this same period according to the SCF are of a smaller magnitude than
what is reported by Saez and Zucman (2014). Depending upon how the SCF data is adjusted, these data
are consistent with an underlying trend somewhere between Scenarios 2 and 4.
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of households are increasing by a modest 1.5% and 0.5% per year, respectively, implies a
future stable U.S. distribution of wealth with unprecedented levels of wealth concentration
for both the low and high estimates of σk. Scenario 4 involves an even faster upward trend
in inequality than Scenario 3, so that according to Theorem 2.4, this scenario implies that
the distribution separates into divergent subpopulations, with the top 0.01% of households
eventually holding all wealth.
Figure 2 jointly plots the distribution of wealth for all four scenarios using the high
estimates of the volatilities σk. This figure shows just how sensitive the future distribution
of wealth is to upward trends in today’s top wealth shares. Even though there is a modest
difference between the outcomes of Scenarios 1 and 2, once the rate at which the share of
wealth held by the top 0.01% of households is assumed to increase by more than 1% per
year as in Scenarios 3 and 4, the future distribution of wealth transforms dramatically.
These hypothetical estimates of the future U.S. distribution of wealth are not intended
as precise quantitative predictions about the future. The future is uncertain and subject to
unpredictable changes in those factors that affect the distribution of wealth, such as policy,
institutions, technology, and globalization. These factors will change in the future, and those
changes will have an effect on the reversion rates −αk and hence on the stable distribution of
wealth. Forecasting changes in these factors is well beyond the scope of this paper. Instead,
the estimates of the future stable U.S. distribution of wealth in Tables 2-5 are intended to
describe the trajectory of inequality in the absence of any future changes in the economic
environment. These estimates describe where the U.S. distribution of wealth is currently
headed, not whether it will actually get there before something else changes its trajectory.
The absolute concentration of wealth that occurs in Scenario 4 is part of an important
set of outcomes in which there is no stable distribution of wealth. This occurs if the share
of wealth held by the top 0.01% of households is increasing rapidly enough, since such rapid
increases imply that the adjusted estimates of the rank-based relative growth rates αk for
many households in the top 0.01% (those households with k ≤ 100) are positive. Too many
values of αk greater than zero violates the stability condition from Theorem 2.3, which states
that α1 + · · ·+ αk < 0, for all k = 1, . . . , N − 1.
In these unstable scenarios, we know from Theorem 2.4 that some subset of households
is diverging from the rest of the population and forming a separate stable distribution that
will eventually hold all wealth. This subset of households eventually separates permanently
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from the rest of the population so that there is no more movement into or out of this top
group. In the case of Scenario 4, this divergent subpopulation consists of the top 0.01% of
households, since most of the adjusted values of the parameters αk are positive for this group
and negative for the rest of the population.
The dynamics by which the U.S. distribution of wealth splits in this scenario are illus-
trated in Figures 3-4. Given initial wealth shares equal to those reported by Saez and Zucman
(2014) for the U.S. in 2012, Figure 3 shows the simulated evolution over time of the shares of
total wealth held by different groups within the top 1% of households in the economy. While
the overall trend of the figure is unmistakable, it is also clear that the divergence of Scenario
4 is uneven, with the share of wealth held by the top 0.01% of households at times decreasing
for several straight years. Over time, however, the top 0.01% of households gradually but
steadily increase their share of total wealth, holding more than 40% of wealth by 2100 and
over 80% of wealth by 2200. Figure 4 shows this same divergent scenario for the top 1% of
households together with the remaining 99% of households in the economy.
In the real world, of course, it is difficult to imagine that the distribution of wealth would
ever truly separate and diverge as in Scenario 4. Long before this occurred, we would expect
that some aspect of the economic environment would change. Interestingly, however, it is
difficult to reject such a divergent trajectory for the current U.S. distribution of wealth.
According to the wealth shares data of Saez and Zucman (2014), the share of wealth held by
the top 0.01% of households in the U.S. has increased by an average of more than 3.5% per
year since 2000 and more than 4% per year since 1980. Changes of this magnitude imply
that the adjusted estimates of the rank-based relative growth rates αk are positive for the
top 0.01% of households using both the low and high estimates of the volatilities σk. It
might be, then, that according to the wealth shares data of Saez and Zucman (2014), the
U.S. distribution of wealth is currently on a temporarily divergent trajectory in which a tiny
minority of wealthy households indefinitely increases its share of total wealth.
Ultimately, these difficult questions about the current trajectory of the U.S. distribution
of wealth and its future direction cannot yet be answered definitively. The exact rate at which
top U.S. wealth shares are currently growing is uncertain and varies across different data
sets, as can be seen by comparing wealth shares estimates using the income-capitalization
method to unadjusted or adjusted estimates from the Survey of Consumer Finances (Saez
and Zucman, 2014). Only as more detailed and high quality data become available will we be
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able to provide answers with greater confidence. While this paper does provide preliminary
answers and estimates, a more important contribution is to introduce a flexible empirical
methodology with which to address these questions.
3.3 Estimating the Effect of a Progressive Capital Tax
In principle, the effects of any tax policy on the distribution of wealth can be approximated
using our empirical approach. All that is necessary are estimates of the effects of the tax
policy on the rank-based reversion rates −αk and volatilities σk. After all, these two factors
alone entirely determine the distribution of wealth. In many cases, however, obtaining reli-
able estimates of the impact of a tax on different households’ reversion rates and volatilities
of wealth is difficult. One important exception is the case of progressive capital taxes.
The empirical approach of Section 2 is uniquely suited to estimating the distributional
impact of progressive capital taxes since such taxes are designed to have more predictable
effects on the growth rates of wealth for different households in the wealth distribution. For
simplicity, we shall assume that a capital tax rate of 1% on some subset of households in the
economy reduces the growth rate of wealth for those households by 1% (and hence also raises
their reversion rates by 1%). Of course, this assumption does not directly take into account
the equilibrium effects that such a tax may have on the saving behavior of households and
the possibility that households may be able to successfully evade the tax. We choose this
simplification because it represents a natural and useful benchmark case in which the reduced
savings of households in response to a capital tax (which magnifies the effect of the tax) are
exactly balanced by households’ ability to evade the tax (which diminishes the effect of the
tax). It is important to emphasize that alternative scenarios for the effect of a progressive
capital tax are easily evaluated using our empirical approach by simply adjusting the tax’s
impact on the growth rates of household wealth accordingly.25 Indeed, it is only for brevity
that we do not consider such alternative scenarios in this paper.
Ever since Piketty (2014) proposed a progressive capital tax in response to increasing
income and wealth inequality, much of the debate surrounding this policy has centered on
25One major challenge of estimating the equilibrium effects of a progressive capital tax involves solving the
portfolio optimization problem facing households in such an environment. Any further progress towards this
end would yield information about how such a tax might alter the growth rates of wealth for different ranked
households in equilibrium. This information could then be incorporated into this paper’s nonparametric
approach to generate general equilibrium estimates of the distributional effect of progressive capital taxes.
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how such taxes are likely to increase government revenues or distort economic outcomes
rather than how they might affect the distribution of wealth. One of the contributions of
this paper is to address this latter issue and provide estimates of the distributional effects
of progressive capital taxes on the U.S. economy. These are purely empirical estimates that
do not rely on any assumptions about the underlying causes of inequality, a point that is
emphasized in the presentation of our model in Section 2.
We analyze a simple progressive capital tax similar to the policy proposed by Piketty
(2014). Our version of this tax sets the capital tax rate for the top 0.5% of households in the
economy equal to 2% and the rate for the top 0.5-1% of households equal to 1%, while the
remaining 99% of households are assumed to neither pay nor receive any tax or subsidy. As a
consequence, none of the revenue generated by the government from this progressive capital
tax is redistributed to less wealthy households.26 Based on the U.S. wealth distribution data
for 2012, this progressive capital tax corresponds to a 2% rate for those households with
total wealth greater than roughly $6 million and a 1% rate for those households with total
wealth between $4 and $6 million.27 In terms of the parameters, we assume that this capital
tax reduces the rank-based relative growth rates αk of those households that are taxed (the
top 1%) by the rate at which they are taxed.
In order to examine a wide range of potential scenarios, we consider the stable distribution
of wealth in the presence of this progressive capital tax for Scenarios 1-4 from Tables 2-5
using the low and high estimates of the volatilities σk. These results are shown in Tables 6-9.
They are also shown graphically in Figures 5-8, which plot the distribution of wealth both
with and without a progressive capital tax for all four scenarios using the high estimates of
the volatilities σk.
In every scenario, the tables and figures show that a simple progressive capital tax im-
posed on just 1% of households in the economy substantially reshapes the distribution of
wealth and reduces inequality. In the case of Scenarios 1 and 2, for example, the after-tax
stable distribution of wealth is similar to the distribution observed in the U.S. in the 1970s,
according to the historical wealth shares data of Saez and Zucman (2014). The fact that
26It is straightforward to consider the distributional effects of such redistribution. However, since we find
that these effects are quite small in our model of the U.S wealth distribution, we focus solely on the simple
case of a tax without redistribution in this section.
27The basic progressive capital tax proposed by Piketty (2014) for Europe involves a 2% rate for those
households with total wealth greater than e5 million, a %1 rate for those households with total wealth
between e1 and e5 million, and no tax for the remaining households.
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this period is one of the most egalitarian in the U.S. in the last century highlights just how
significant this reduction in inequality is. Even for Scenarios 3 and 4, in which the distribu-
tion of wealth is either highly or fully concentrated at the top in the absence of a progressive
capital tax, in all cases the tax reduces inequality to levels lower than those observed in
the U.S. in 2012. This large effect is seen clearly in Figure 8. Because there is no stable
distribution using the high estimates of σk in the case of Scenario 4, this figure represents
the distribution of wealth without a progressive capital tax by a vertical line indicating that
the top 0.01% of households hold all the wealth in the economy. Only with the tax in place
does a stable distribution exist, as shown by the dashed red line in the figure.
How is it that a 1-2% progressive capital tax levied on only 1% of households can reduce
inequality so substantially? One might expect that such a large reduction in inequality
requires that a larger subset of households be taxed. However, because the top 1% of
households that pay the tax hold between 40-100% of total wealth depending upon the
scenario, a large fraction of the economy’s total wealth is in fact affected by this progressive
capital tax. As the model demonstrates, this large fraction of total wealth is sufficient for
the tax to significantly reshape the distribution of wealth.
Finally, we stress that this result is not a statement about total welfare and not an
endorsement of a progressive capital tax. As discussed in the introduction, our statistical
model only generates empirical estimates of the distributional effects of taxes and other
policies, it does not measure any distortions or costs associated with such policies. Our
results about the effects of progressive capital taxes on inequality are intended only to add
to our knowledge of the overall effects of such a policy.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a statistical model of inequality in which heterogeneous
households are subject to both aggregate and idiosyncratic fluctuations in their wealth hold-
ings. The model imposes few restrictions and no parametric structure on these fluctuations
of household wealth. In this setting, we apply new techniques to obtain a closed-form
household-by-household characterization of the stable distribution of wealth. According to
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this characterization, the distribution of wealth is shaped entirely by two factors—the re-
version rates and idiosyncratic volatilities of wealth for different ranked households. The
simplicity and generality of this result suggests that to understand the effect of factors such
as policy, institutions, technology, or globalization on inequality, it is necessary only to un-
derstand the effect of these factors on the reversion rates and idiosyncratic volatilities of
wealth. As a consequence, more detailed empirical work focused on accurately measuring
the reversion rates and volatilities of wealth as well as any variation in these two factors over
time and across different regions is likely to yield substantial new insights.
Our statistical model can exactly match any empirical distribution, and we use the wealth
shares data of Saez and Zucman (2014) to construct such a match for the 2012 U.S. distri-
bution of wealth. One of the challenges in analyzing this distribution is that these wealth
shares data show a clear upward trend in top shares over the past three decades. These
upward trends imply that any analysis that relies on a stable or steady-state distribution
of wealth is flawed. This paper introduces a methodology that can address these stability
issues. In particular, our approach allows us to estimate the future stable distribution of
wealth in the presence of trends in top wealth shares. We present such estimates for several
alternative scenarios, but the most likely scenario might be that according to the wealth
shares data of Saez and Zucman (2014), the U.S. distribution of wealth is on a temporar-
ily unstable trajectory in which it separates into two divergent subpopulations. We also
present estimates of the distributional implications of progressive capital taxes. Specifically,
we consider a capital tax of 1-2% levied on 1% of households similar to the tax proposed by
Piketty (2014). Although the full effect of this tax depends on the uncertain future stable
distribution of wealth, in all cases we find that this tax substantially reduces inequality and
reshapes the distribution of wealth.
The statistical model that we develop in this paper is based on a general approach to
rank-based systems. Although this approach is well-suited to modeling the distribution of
wealth, it is not restricted to only modeling wealth. In fact, only in the case of unstable or
i.i.d.-like processes is our general approach clearly not appropriate. This means that there
are other areas of economics, such as the distribution of income and the world distribution
of output, in which our tractable solution techniques may provide new information.
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A Assumptions and Regularity Conditions
In this appendix, we present the assumptions and regularity conditions that are necessary
for the stable wealth distribution characterization in Theorem 2.3. As discussed in Section
2, these assumptions admit a large class of continuous wealth processes for the households in
the economy. The first assumption establishes basic integrability conditions that are common
for both continuous semimartingales and Itoˆ processes.
Assumption A.1. For all i = 1, . . . , N , the growth rate processes µi satisfy∫ T
0
|µi(t)| dt <∞, T > 0, a.s., (A.1)
and the volatility processes δi satisfy∫ T
0
(
δ21(t) + · · ·+ δ2M(t)
)
dt <∞, T > 0, a.s., (A.2)
δ21(t) + · · ·+ δ2M(t) > 0, t > 0, a.s. (A.3)
lim
t→∞
1
t
(
δ21(t) + · · ·+ δ2M(t)
)
log log t = 0, a.s., (A.4)
Conditions (A.1) and (A.2) are standard in the definition of an Itoˆ process, while condition
(A.3) ensures that household wealth holdings contain a nonzero random component at all
times. Condition (A.4) is similar to a boundedness condition in that it ensures that the
variance of household wealth holdings does not diverge to infinity too rapidly.
The second assumption underlying our results establishes that no two households’ wealth
holdings be perfectly correlated over time. In other words, there must always be some
idiosyncratic component to household wealth dynamics. Finally, we also assume that no
household’s wealth holdings relative to the economy shall disappear too rapidly.
Assumption A.2. The symmetric matrix ρ(t), given by ρ(t) = (ρij(t)), where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N ,
is nonsingular for all t > 0, a.s.
Assumption A.3. For all i = 1, . . . , N , the wealth share processes θi satisfy
lim
t→∞
1
t
log θi(t) = 0, a.s. (A.5)
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B Proofs
This appendix presents the proofs of Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2 and Theorems 2.3 and 2.4.
Proof of Lemma 2.1. By definition, w(t) = w1(t) + · · · + wN(t) and for all i = 1, . . . , N ,
θi(t) = wi(t)/w(t). This implies that
dw(t) =
N∑
i=1
dwi(t) =
N∑
i=1
θi(t)w(t)
dwi(t)
wi(t)
,
from which it follows that
dw(t)
w(t)
=
N∑
i=1
θi(t)
dwi(t)
wi(t)
. (B.1)
We wish to show that the process satisfying equation (2.3) also satisfies equation (B.1).
If we apply Itoˆ’s Lemma to the exponential function, then equation (2.3) yields
dw(t) = w(t)µ(t) dt+
1
2
w(t)
N∑
i,j=1
θi(t)θj(t)
(
M∑
z=1
δiz(t)δjz(t)
)
dt
+ w(t)
N∑
i=1
M∑
z=1
θi(t)δiz(t) dBz(t),
(B.2)
a.s., where µ(t) is given by equation (2.5). Using the definition of ρij(t) from equation (2.2),
we can simplify equation (B.1) and write
dw(t)
w(t)
=
(
µ(t) +
1
2
N∑
i,j=1
θi(t)θj(t)ρij(t)
)
dt+
N∑
i=1
M∑
z=1
θi(t)δiz(t) dBz(t). (B.3)
Similarly, the definition of µ(t) from equation (2.5) allows us to further simplify equation
(B.3) and write
dw(t)
w(t)
=
(
N∑
i=1
θi(t)µi(t) +
1
2
N∑
i=1
θi(t)ρii(t)
)
dt+
N∑
i=1
M∑
z=1
θi(t)δiz(t) dBz(t)
=
N∑
i=1
θi(t)
(
µi(t) +
1
2
ρii(t)
)
dt+
N∑
i=1
M∑
z=1
θi(t)δiz(t) dBz(t). (B.4)
If we again apply Itoˆ’s Lemma to the exponential function, then equation (2.1) yields,
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a.s., for all i = 1, . . . , N ,
dwi(t) = wi(t)
(
µi(t) +
1
2
M∑
z=1
δ2iz(t)
)
dt+ wi(t)
M∑
z=1
δiz(t) dBz(t)
= wi(t)
(
µi(t) +
1
2
ρii(t)
)
dt+ wi(t)
M∑
z=1
δiz(t) dBz(t). (B.5)
Substituting equation (B.5) into equation (B.4) then yields
dw(t)
w(t)
=
N∑
i=1
θi(t)
dwi(t)
wi(t)
,
which completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2.2. The household wealth processes wi are absolutely continuous in the
sense that the random signed measures µi(t) dt and ρii(t) dt are absolutely continuous with
respect to Lebesgue measure. As a consequence, we can apply Lemma 4.1.7 and Proposition
4.1.11 from Fernholz (2002), which yields equations (2.11) and (2.12).
Proof of Theorem 2.3. This proof follows arguments from Chapter 5 of Fernholz (2002).
According to equation (2.14), for all k = 1, . . . , N ,
log θ(k)(T ) =
∫ T
0
(
µpt(k)(t)− µ(t)
)
dt+
1
2
Λlog θ(k)−log θ(k+1)(T )−
1
2
Λlog θ(k−1)−log θ(k)(T )
+
M∑
z=1
∫ T
0
δpt(k)z(t) dBz(t)−
N∑
i=1
M∑
z=1
∫ T
0
θi(t)δiz(t) dBz(t).
(B.6)
Consider the asymptotic behavior of the process log θ(k). Assuming that the limits from equa-
tion (2.18) exist, then according to the definition of αk from equation (2.16), the asymptotic
behavior of log θ(k) satisfies
lim
T→∞
1
T
log θ(k)(T ) = αk +
1
2
κk − 1
2
κk−1 + lim
T→∞
1
T
M∑
z=1
∫ T
0
δpt(k)z(t) dBz(t)
− lim
T→∞
1
T
N∑
i=1
M∑
z=1
∫ T
0
θi(t)δiz(t) dBz(t), a.s.
(B.7)
Assumption A.3 ensures that the term on the left-hand side of equation (B.7) is equal to
zero, while Assumption A.1 ensures that the last two terms of the right-hand side of this
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equation are equal to zero as well (see Lemma 1.3.2 from Fernholz, 2002). If we simplify
equation (B.7), then, we have that
αk =
1
2
κk−1 − 1
2
κk, (B.8)
which implies that
αk − αk+1 = 1
2
κk−1 − κk + 1
2
κk+1, (B.9)
for all k = 1, . . . , N − 1. Since equation (B.8) is valid for all k = 1, . . . , N , this establishes a
system of equations that we can solve for κk. Doing this yields the equality
κk = −2(α1 + · · ·+ αk), (B.10)
for all k = 1, . . . , N . Note that asymptotic stability ensures that α1 + · · · + αk < 0 for
all k = 1, . . . , N , while the fact that αN =
1
2
κN−1 = −(α1 + · · · + αN−1) ensures that
α1 + · · · + αN = 0. Furthermore, if α1 + · · · + αk > 0 for some 1 ≤ k < N , then equation
(B.10) generates a contradiction since κk ≥ 0 by definition. In this case, it must be that
Assumption A.3 is violated and limT→∞ 1T log θ(k)(T ) 6= 0 for some 1 ≤ k ≤ N . This case is
examined in detail in Theorem 2.4.
The last term on the right-hand side of equation (2.15) is an absolutely continuous martin-
gale, and hence can be represented as a stochastic integral with respect to Brownian motion
B(t).28 This fact, together with equation (B.9) and the definitions of αk and σk from equa-
tions (2.16)-(2.17), motivates our use of the stable version of the process log θ(k)− log θ(k+1).
Recall that, by equation (2.19), this stable version is given by
d
(
log θˆ(k)(t)− log θˆ(k+1)(t)
)
= −κk dt+ dΛlog θˆ(k)−log θˆ(k+1)(t) + σk dB(t), (B.11)
for all k = 1, . . . , N−1. According to Fernholz (2002), Lemma 5.2.1, for all k = 1, . . . , N−1,
the time-averaged limit of this stable version satisfies
lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
(
log θˆ(k)(t)− log θˆ(k+1)(t)
)
dt =
σ2k
2κk
=
σ2k
−4(α1 + · · ·+ αk) , (B.12)
a.s., where the last equality follows from equation (B.10). To the extent that the stable
version of log θ(k) − log θ(k+1) from equation (B.11) approximates the true version of this
process from equation (2.15), the time-averaged limit of the true process log θ(k) − log θ(k+1)
will be approximated by −σ2k/4(α1 + · · ·+ αk), for all k = 1, . . . , N − 1.
28This is a standard result for continuous-time stochastic processes (Karatzas and Shreve, 1991; Nielsen,
1999).
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Proof of Theorem 2.4. Note that the divergent scenario of Theorem 2.4 violates Assump-
tion A.3, which states that no household’s share of wealth declines to zero too quickly.
In order to prove this theorem, it is necessary to show that the largest subset of house-
holds for which Assumption A.3 holds is also the subset of households m < N satisfying
Am = max1≤k≤N Ak and Am > Al for l 6= m.
Suppose that the top n ≤ N wealthiest households in the economy form the largest
subset of households for which Assumption A.3 holds. More precisely, suppose that
lim
T→∞
1
T
log θ(1)(T ) = · · · = lim
T→∞
1
T
log θ(n)(T ) = 0, a.s., (B.13)
and
0 > lim
T→∞
1
T
log θ(n+1)(T ) ≥ · · · ≥ lim
T→∞
1
T
log θ(N)(T ), a.s., (B.14)
so that there exists some finite time t0 such that after t0, the top n wealthiest households
are never overtaken by the remaining households in the economy again.29 Indeed, this
follows because equations (B.13) and (B.14) imply that there exists some t0 <∞ such that
logw(n)(t) > logw(n+1)(t), a.s., for all t ≥ t0 and that
lim
T→∞
θ(1)(T ) + · · ·+ θ(n)(T ) = 1, a.s. (B.15)
Without loss of generality, let the wealth holdings of the n wealthiest households in the
economy at time t0 be w1(t0), . . . , wn(t0).
Consider the wealth holdings of the top n wealthiest households in the economy, which
we denote by
wn(t) = w(1)(t) + · · ·+ w(n)(t) = wpt(1)(t) + · · ·+ wpt(n)(t).
Because Assumption A.3 is valid for the n wealthiest households in the economy at time
t0, according to Fernholz (2002), Propositions 1.3.1 and 2.1.2, and using Assumption A.1,
equation (A.4), it follows that
lim
T→∞
logwn(T )
T
= lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
µi(t) dt, a.s., (B.16)
where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. By definition, for all i = 1, . . . , n,
µi(t) =
n∑
k=1
µpt(k)(t)I{0}
(
θi(t)− θ(k)(t)
)
,
29The existence of the limits in equation (B.14) is ensured by equation (B.7) together with the assumption
that the limits from equations (2.16)-(2.18) exist.
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and hence by equation (B.16),
lim
T→∞
logwn(T )
T
= lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
n∑
k=1
µpt(k)(t)I{0}
(
θi(t)− θ(k)(t)
)
dt, a.s. (B.17)
If the households in the economy are ex-ante symmetric, then all of them must spend equal
fractions of time in any given rank (Banner et al., 2005). As a consequence, for all k =
1, . . . , n,
lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
I{0}
(
θi(t)− θ(k)(t)
)
dt =
1
n
, a.s.,
which together with equation (B.17) implies that
lim
T→∞
logwn(T )
T
= lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
1
n
n∑
k=1
µpt(k)(t) dt, a.s.
By the definition of An from equation (2.21), it follows that
lim
T→∞
logwn(T )
T
= An + lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
µ(t) dt, a.s.
Of course, because wn converges to w over time, it follows by equation (B.15) that An = 0.
Intuitively, the relative growth rate of wn must equal zero since wn gradually encompasses
all wealth in the economy.
Suppose that m < n. Because Assumption A.3 is valid for the n wealthiest households
in the economy at time t0, we can simply reproduce the proof of Theorem 2.3 for this top
subset of households. However, if Am > An, equation (B.10) generates a contradiction since
it implies that
κm = −(α1 + · · ·+ αm) = −mAm < 0,
while κk ≥ 0 for all 1 ≤ k ≤ N , by definition from equation (2.18) (see also the discussion
in the proof of Theorem 2.3). Thus, we conclude that m ≥ n.
Suppose that m > n, so that by definition
αn+1 + · · ·+ αm
m− n > An. (B.18)
According to equation (B.7) from the proof of Theorem 2.3, we have that
lim
T→∞
1
T
log θ(n+1)(T )+ · · ·+ lim
T→∞
1
T
log θ(m)(T ) = αn+1+ · · ·+αm+ 1
2
κm− 1
2
κn, a.s. (B.19)
Of course, by assumption κn = 0, since after t0 the top n wealthiest households are never
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overtaken by the remaining households in the economy again (recall the definition of a local
time Λx). Furthermore, by equation (B.18), it follows that αn+1 + · · · + αm > 0 and hence
that the right-hand side of equation (B.19) is greater than zero (κm ≥ 0 as well). This is a
contradiction, however, since we assumed in equation (B.14) above that the left-hand side
of equation (B.19) is less than zero. Thus, we conclude that m = n and that the largest
subset of households for which Assumption A.3 holds is also the subset of households m < N
satisfying Am = max1≤k≤N Ak and Am > Al for l 6= m.
Having proved the separation and divergence of the top subset of households w(1), . . . , w(m),
all that remains is to prove that this subset forms a stable distribution. This follows from
Theorem 2.3 and the fact that Am > Al for l 6= m, since this condition ensures that the
relative growth rates for this top subset of households satisfies the stability condition of
Theorem 2.3.
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Household Wealth Low Estimate High Estimate
Percent Rank Volatility σk Volatility σk
0-10 0.283 0.286
10-20 0.283 0.294
20-40 0.283 0.316
40-60 0.283 0.392
60-100 0.283 1.662
Table 1: Low and high estimates of the volatilities σk.
Household Wealth Wealth Shares with Wealth Shares with
Percent Rank Low Estimate Volatility σk High Estimate Volatility σk
0-0.01 11.1% 11.1%
0.01-0.1 10.8% 10.8%
0.1-0.5 12.4% 12.4%
0.5-1 7.2% 7.2%
1-10 35.7% 35.7%
10-100 22.8% 22.8%
Table 2: Household wealth shares for different estimates of the volatilities σk under Scenario
1, which assumes that the 2012 U.S. wealth distribution is stable.
Household Wealth Wealth Shares with Wealth Shares with
Percent Rank Low Estimate Volatility σk High Estimate Volatility σk
0-0.01 36.8% 35.9%
0.01-0.1 7.9% 8.1%
0.1-0.5 8.2% 8.5%
0.5-1 4.7% 4.9%
1-10 23.4% 24.2%
10-100 19.0% 18.5%
Table 3: Household wealth shares for different estimates of the volatilities σk under Scenario
2, which assumes that the share of wealth held by the top 0.01% of households is increasing
by 1% per year while the share of total wealth held by the bottom 90% of households is
decreasing by 0.5% per year.
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Household Wealth Wealth Shares with Wealth Shares with
Percent Rank Low Estimate Volatility σk High Estimate Volatility σk
0-0.01 87.9% 85.9%
0.01-0.1 2.0% 2.3%
0.1-0.5 1.5% 1.8%
0.5-1 0.8% 1.0%
1-10 3.9% 4.8%
10-100 3.9% 4.2%
Table 4: Household wealth shares for different estimates of the volatilities σk under Scenario
3, which assumes that the shares of wealth held by the top 0.01% and 0.01-0.1% of households
are increasing by 1.5% and 0.5% per year, respectively, while the share of total wealth held
by the bottom 90% of households is decreasing by 1% per year.
Household Wealth Wealth Shares with Wealth Shares with
Percent Rank Low Estimate Volatility σk High Estimate Volatility σk
0-0.01 100% 100%
0.01-0.1 0% 0%
0.1-0.5 0% 0%
0.5-1 0% 0%
1-10 0% 0%
10-100 0% 0%
Table 5: Household wealth shares for different estimates of the volatilities σk under Scenario
4, which assumes that the shares of wealth held by the top 0.01% and 0.01-0.1% of households
are increasing by 3% and 1% per year, respectively, while the share of total wealth held by
the bottom 90% of households is decreasing by 1.5% per year.
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Household Wealth Wealth Shares with Wealth Shares with
Percent Rank Low Estimate Volatility σk High Estimate Volatility σk
0-0.01 1.5% 1.5%
0.01-0.1 4.0% 4.1%
0.1-0.5 8.4% 8.4%
0.5-1 6.7% 6.8%
1-10 44.9% 45.0%
10-100 34.6% 34.2%
Table 6: Household wealth shares with a 1-2% progressive capital tax on the top 1% of
households for different estimates of the volatilities σk under Scenario 1.
Household Wealth Wealth Shares with Wealth Shares with
Percent Rank Low Estimate Volatility σk High Estimate Volatility σk
0-0.01 1.8% 1.9%
0.01-0.1 3.8% 3.9%
0.1-0.5 7.7% 7.9%
0.5-1 6.2% 6.3%
1-10 41.0% 42.0%
10-100 39.6% 37.9%
Table 7: Household wealth shares with a 1-2% progressive capital tax on the top 1% of
households for different estimates of the volatilities σk under Scenario 2.
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Household Wealth Wealth Shares with Wealth Shares with
Percent Rank Low Estimate Volatility σk High Estimate Volatility σk
0-0.01 2.4% 2.5%
0.01-0.1 3.9% 4.1%
0.1-0.5 7.2% 7.6%
0.5-1 5.7% 6.0%
1-10 37.6% 39.2%
10-100 43.3% 40.7%
Table 8: Household wealth shares with a 1-2% progressive capital tax on the top 1% of
households for different estimates of the volatilities σk under Scenario 3.
Household Wealth Wealth Shares with Wealth Shares with
Percent Rank Low Estimate Volatility σk High Estimate Volatility σk
0-0.01 14.6% 14.8%
0.01-0.1 3.8% 4.0%
0.1-0.5 6.0% 6.4%
0.5-1 4.7% 4.9%
1-10 30.5% 32.3%
10-100 40.5% 37.5%
Table 9: Household wealth shares with a 1-2% progressive capital tax on the top 1% of
households for different estimates of the volatilities σk under Scenario 4.
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Figure 1: Household wealth shares for the model matched to the U.S. wealth distribution in
2012.
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Figure 2: Household wealth shares for high estimates of the volatilities σk under Scenarios 1
(solid black line), 2 (dashed red line), 3 (dotted blue line), and 4 (vertical dot-dashed green
line).
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Figure 3: The shares of total wealth held by the top 0.01% (solid black line), 0.01-0.1%
(dashed red line), 0.1-0.5% (dotted green line), and 0.5-1% (dot-dashed blue line) of house-
holds over time for high estimates of the volatilities σk under Scenario 4.
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Figure 4: The shares of total wealth held by the top 1% (solid black line), 1-10% (dashed
red line), and bottom 90% (dotted green line) of households over time for high estimates of
the volatilities σk under Scenario 4.
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Figure 5: Household wealth shares with (dashed red line) and without (solid black line) a
1-2% progressive capital tax on the top 1% of households for high estimates of the volatilities
σk under Scenario 1.
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Figure 6: Household wealth shares with (dashed red line) and without (solid black line) a
1-2% progressive capital tax on the top 1% of households for high estimates of the volatilities
σk under Scenario 2.
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Figure 7: Household wealth shares with (dashed red line) and without (solid black line) a
1-2% progressive capital tax on the top 1% of households for high estimates of the volatilities
σk under Scenario 3.
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Figure 8: Household wealth shares with (dashed red line) and without (vertical solid black
line) a 1-2% progressive capital tax on the top 1% of households for high estimates of the
volatilities σk under Scenario 4.
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